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Introduction
In the early days of 1991, the world watched as longtime enemies and allies stood side by side to buttress the foundations of international order, forcefully removing Saddam
Hussein from Kuwait and widely announcing the dawn of a New World Order.
1 The proclamation by President George H.W. Bush was not merely rhetoric. As the world lay witness to the unmistakable thaw between the United States and the soon to be the former Soviet Union, tectonic shifts were occurring under the feet of United States military men and women everywhere. These changes would cause a reprioritization of missions away from the defense of the GIUK and Fulda Gaps and towards more nuanced and ambiguous mission sets now folded into the modern concept of the Range of Military Operations (ROMO).
2 Interestingly, only five months after the start of Desert Storm, over 7,000 homebound troops would find themselves part of Operation Sea Angel, an effort to save tens of thousands in
Bangladesh on a mission we now call Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA). mission show a marked increase in the favorability of the U.S. from polling done prior to the missions. 5 However, beneath these strategic success stories, perhaps hidden by them, is the fact that the ad hoc nature of FHA mission organization and execution as prescribed by current doctrine runs contrary to established operational principles and elements. Current operations in support of FHA missions lack adequate unity of effort and are unable to respond efficiently and effectively to the world's disasters. Several models available seek to address this problem and will be discussed in this analysis. However, none fully addresses the shortfalls currently implicit within FHA doctrine. Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) and the victims of regional disasters are better served through the creation of standing Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)-FHA headquarters elements. Unfortunately, the proposed establishment of a standing JIATF-FHA headquarters will undoubtedly come at a cost. Additionally, staffing JIATF-FHA headquarters elements will require substantial manning and budgetary commitments on operational commanders and United States Government (USG) agencies alike. To that end, current policy direction and initiatives recognize the need for greater civilian engagement and support for the costs associated with the FHA mission.
In addition, the U.S. was engaged in eight additional missions focused on Humanitarian Assistance during the same period. 5 Pew Research Center, -America's Image in the World: Findings from the Pew Global Attitudes Project,‖ 8-9.
FHA Strategic Foundation
Prior to embarking on an operational assessment of Department of Defense (DOD) However, recent history has shown that while USAID/OFDA is tasked with the FHA mission, its lack of funding, manning and resources have meant that the DOD has taken on much of the planning and execution of major disaster relief operations worldwide.
7
Before initiating an assessment of the current FHA operational construct, and certainly before recommending changes to it, the strategic foundation that underpins the FHA mission must be established. If it can be determined that the operational objectives of FHA do not support the larger strategic objectives then an entire re-evaluation of the mission should be undertaken rather than merely recommending modifications to make operational execution more effective. Fortunately, the strategic guidance from which FHA springs forth is quite clear. Pakistani earthquake it was shown that the presence and relief offered and executed by the U.S. had a direct impact on U.S. favorability in these predominately Muslim states.
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Additionally, studies done by the Center for Naval Analysis have shown that humanitarian assistance operations have a direct and positive effect on political and economic stability.
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Having established that 1) the mission of Foreign Humanitarian Assistance is rooted in concrete strategic objectives and reflected in specific operational tasking, and 2) that FHA operations have shown themselves to be directly supporting of the strategic objectives, a more critical analysis of the FHA operations themselves can be made.
Methodology and Assumptions
First, it is critical to differentiate between external and internal perspectives when assessing the effectiveness of FHA at the operational level. Humanitarian aid as viewed by external audiences (the affected region or the international community as a whole) is absolute in nature with the success of the operation being the fact that aid is or is not rendered.
However, internal measurements of effectiveness need to be judged on a relative scale that reflects the difference between our potential effectiveness and the actual effect brought to time between the specific initiating event (typhoon, flood, earthquake, etc.) and its relief through the efforts of the responding force is directly proportional to mission accomplishment. Simply stated, reducing response time reduces human suffering.
Lastly, the DOD dictionary (JP 1-02) defines the term unity of effort as, At the end of the day, unity of effort across the U.S. government is not just about being more efficient or even more effective in operations. It can determine whether the United States succeeds or fails in a given intervention. It can also determine whether the ultimate costs of success-both dollars spent and lives lost or forever changed-are as low as possible or higher than necessary. In this sense, unity of effort is not just something that is nice to have; it is imperative.
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In summary, this analysis will look at the current doctrinal FHA model and three proposed structural and/or procedural changes and weigh them against their ability to create and sustain unity of effort while simultaneously compressing the time between disaster and response.
Model 1: Current Ad Hoc
Current doctrine for the planning and execution of FHA operations can be found within JP 3-07.6 (Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance). When tasked to respond to a disaster within their area of responsibility (AOR) the GCC is advised to create a Joint Task Force (JTF) to plan and direct relief efforts. This JTF is created, -… to accomplish missions with specific, limited objectives…,‖ 18 and additionally, -… is dissolved by the proper authority when the purpose for which it was created has been achieved or when it is no longer required.‖ 19 Simply put, doctrine directs the construction of an ad hoc JTF command and control organization mobilized quickly and with available forces in order to plan for and provide assistance to regions experiencing a disaster or other humanitarian need. This ad hoc nature of the created command structure has critical implications for rapid planning and response to contingencies within the AOR. contacts, then the JTF/SJFHQ team faces the same challenges to mission success -the ability to quickly plan and execute in a highly dynamic FHA environment.
Model 2: Ad Hoc, but Coordinated
Having assessed the essential weakness of ad hoc JTF creation by the GCC in support of the FHA mission as a critical lack of experience, training and established relationships that influence unity of effort and the ability to plan quickly and efficiently, a more persistent and dedicated organization must be pursued. In order to rectify this structural defect within FHA Of all the models discussed thus far, the CSIS construct most closely addresses the current doctrinal deficit within the FHA mission. Establishing a persistent organization, through the ICPT, tasked with planning and training towards the FHA mission will reduce much of the time required by responding forces to understand regional idiosyncrasies, multinational capabilities and establish vital 38 Schaub, -Really Soft Power,‖ 2. 39 relationships. Additionally, best practices initiated by the ICPT can be used by responding forces to increase efficiency of operations. Lastly, the dual command structure proposed offers the greatest ability to establish clear unity of effort across the response agency spectrum. However, this construct still lacks a cohesive and experienced staff core to respond to crises. Regardless of the effectiveness of the ICPT, a responding JIATF established at the time of the disaster will undoubtedly face the same challenges that ad hoc JTFs encounter in the previous models. Without a persistent and standing JIATF, forming the core of the headquarters element that would respond to an assigned FHA mission, the GCC cannot minimize response time to regional disasters nor can critical unity of effort be assured for mission planning and execution.
Model 4: The Answer -Persistent Integration
Having stepped through current and proposed organizational models as they pertain to the preparation and response to foreign natural disasters by U.S. forces, it has been shown that without a persistent and engaged interagency task force structure, the ability to respond quickly and operate efficiently is severely restricted. At the heart of the current doctrinal faults lies the ad hoc nature of JTF creation. As Deputy Secretary Flournoy flatly states, -This ad hoc approach has kept the United States from learning from its mistakes and improving its performance in complex contingencies over time. It is no wonder that U.S.
personnel who have served in multiple operations over the last 10-15 years lament feeling a bit like Sisyphus.‖ 41 By bringing together command structures, planners and execution forces only when needed, the ability to leverage seasoned planners with the training, relationships and the experience to execute operations is missing. By creating a standing structure with the authority, funding and capacity to plan and execute missions in a fully integrated interagency environment, the ability to achieve essential unity of effort and a swift response to emergent situations is increased immensely.
The solution to the problem lies in the doctrinal establishment of a standing JIATF-FHA attached to each GCC. As the Movinski article eludes to and the CSIS analysis proposes, this organization would be led through a dual command relationship between DOD and USAID. 42 However, this would not be the extent of interagency manning for the JIATF- accomplished in a swift and expeditious manner with a high degree of unity of effort. 43 It is important to note that standing these organizations up in an expeditious manner directly contributes to timely response to critical needs throughout the disaster area. This is an especially daunting task for current ad hoc JTF organizations, leading to time extending friction, poor mission prioritization and common misallocation of life saving resources.
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Recent analysis of joint FHA doctrine and numerous documented operational lessons learned have identified the current ad hoc nature of FHA response as a structural defect that adversely affects the mission. 45 Both proposed models (ad hoc, but coordinated and ad hoc, but integrated) discussed to differing degrees, the need for a persistent staff structure to address GCC FHA planning and execution. This analysis finds that while both proposals address the structural issues, they do not address the problem of persistency, which directly impacts the ability to quickly establish essential unity of effort. This persistency can be achieved through the creation of the proposed standing JIATF-FHA. Unfortunately, this organization comes at cost in money and manpower. The question to policy makers becomes whether or not the FHA mission constitutes enough of a strategic imperative to direct the funding and manning of the JIATF-FHA as proposed. Increased interagency coordination to 43 The MPAT concept, developed in 1999, is a powerful organizational tool that allows for greater coordination between numerous nations, IGOs the level discussed in this paper is one of current and heated national debate. 46 An analysis of strategic direction at the national and operational level would lead the reader to believe that the benefits gleaned from national response to international disasters is a strategic imperative which will only increase in the future. 47 This being the case, the establishment of regional JIATF-FHA elements folded within a rationalized DOS/Unified Command Plan (UCP) 48 under each GCC should be directed by executive order with the funding and resources provided through Congressional action. 
Conclusion
In his extensive review of the 2004 tsunami relief efforts, Dr. Bruce Elleman of the Naval War College concluded that, while not perfect, the relief efforts, -… dramatically improved U.S.-Indonesian government-to-government and military to-military relations, and so furthered the goals of the global war on terror and of regional cooperation.‖ 53 As discussed earlier in this paper, objective post-disaster analysis supports this view. When disaster relief efforts are viewed externally, especially from the viewpoint of a man, woman or child that is suffering, there can be no doubt that the herculean efforts made by our men and women in uniform are an unqualified good and very difficult to criticize. However, and as this analysis has sought to point out, the internal operational view of the FHA mission leaves much to be improved. The ability to achieve unity of effort throughout the interagency team and to respond quickly and efficiently is central to successful FHA missions at the operational level. Without the ability to achieve this unity of effort, the Combatant Commanders are left with ad hoc organizations with little or no experience in disaster relief, ill prepared for the mission and that take valuable time to stand-up. In this environment, responding JTFs are forced to re-learn valuable lessons that have been documented time and time again.
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The challenge that the GCCs face with interagency coordination and execution is certainly not an operational anomaly of the FHA mission itself. The ability to project soft power and establish influence within the Combatant Commanders' AOR, increasingly, is not a matter of military force alone. Combatant and Diplomatic commanders must be able to draw on established and integrated staff structures that are in full alignment and leverage the unique capabilities of all USG sources of power. However, while this viewpoint is widely held it seems there are deeply entrenched constituencies within all USG agencies willing to place parochialism before national security. 55 Any structural changes that reflect the proposed establishment of a dual-command standing JIATF-FHA within the GCC staff will not happen until these larger issues are addressed. Until then, American men and women in uniform and out, doing the best they can with what they are given, will answer the call when needed and work tirelessly to relieve pain and suffering when and where it occurs. 54 Flournoy, -Achieving Unity of Effort in Interagency Operations,‖ 2. 55 Major structural shifts towards greater integration between USG agencies is a major theme of many in the policy field -Campbell and Flournoy, The Inheritance and the Way Forward, 28, Murdoch and Weitz, -Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: New Proposals for Defense Reform,‖ 40, and Schaub, -Really Soft Power,‖ 1.
